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Abstract
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents.
Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even
though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to
elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with or-
dinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive
protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers al-
ternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings.
First, we assume that each party has full information about the other
party’s preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied
negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining
rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several
solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case
where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and
the case where only one party is uninformed.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties over one or more issues,
where each party has some preferences regarding the discussed issues, and the
negotiation process aims to reach an agreement that would be beneficial to
the parties. The basic automated negotiation protocol, which consists of two
1
parties that alternate offers, was introduced by Rubinstein [19]. Since then a
lot of work has been done to develop other types of protocols, and to extend
the basic bilateral negotiation protocol [10].
Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, i.e., with
utility functions that give different outcomes a specific numerical value, accord-
ing to the agents’ preferences. This representation requires the agents to specify
the magnitude of how much they prefer one outcome over another. However,
this specification is not always readily available. Moreover, in many cases the
agents need to act on behalf of humans, and the use of cardinal utilities for
representing human preferences has been widely criticized on the grounds of
cognitive complexity, difficulty of elicitation, and other factors (e.g., [2]). On
the other hand, ordinal preferences only rank the outcomes, so they reduce
cognitive burden and are easier to elicit.
Indeed, there are some negotiation protocols that work with ordinal prefer-
ences. However, these protocols only start with the ordinal preferences, and they
then convert them to a cardinal utility according to some assumptions [16, 20].
Moreover, the traditional assumption in the negotiation theory is that there is
a continuum of feasible outcomes. However, many real-life situations involve a
finite number of outcomes, such as two managers choosing from among a few
job candidates, or a couple choosing from among a few apartments. Even in
negotiation over monetary payoffs, the number of outcomes is bounded by the
indivisibility of the smallest monetary unit.
In this paper we study negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set
of outcomes, without converting the ordinal preferences to a cardinal utility 1.
We analyze an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation that was introduced
by Anbarci [3], where the two parties make alternating offers. Each offer is a
possible outcome, and we allow the parties to make any offer they would like,
in any order. The only restriction is that no offer can be made twice, thus if
there are m possible outcomes the negotiation will last at most m rounds.
We analyze the negotiation protocol in different settings. First, we assume
that each party has full information about the other party’s preference order,
and she will thus take this into account and act strategically when deciding
what to offer. We provide elegant strategies that specify a Sub-game Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) for the parties. Specifically, our strategies are easy to im-
plement, and we improve the previous result of [4] and find a SPE strategy in
linear time instead of quadratic time.
We note that there are several works that studied bargaining rules with or-
dinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes, but they are inherently different
from non-cooperative negotiation protocols. A bargaining rule is a function that
assigns to each negotiation instance a subset of the outcomes, which are consid-
ered the result of the negotiation. These rules are useful only in a cooperative
environment, or where there is a central authority that can force the parties to
offer specific outcomes in a specific order.
1This is also the assumption in most of the voting literature [7], but see [5] that analyzes
social choice functions after extracting cardinal utilities from ordinal preferences.
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The proof that our proposed strategies specify a SPE provides us with a
deep understanding of the negotiation protocol, which enables us to establish a
connection to the results of the designed Rational Compromise (RC) bargaining
rule [12]. Surprisingly, the SPE result of the negotiation protocol is always part
of the set of results returned by the RC rule, even though the protocol does
not force the parties to offer specific outcomes in a specific order as the RC
rule does. This connection also enables us to prove that the SPE result of the
protocol is monotonic.
We then move on to analyze the no information setting. We analyze the
case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party nor do
they know prior probability distribution over possible orders. In this setting we
first show that an ex-post SPE does not exist. We then provide the maxmin
strategy and the maxmin value of the game that is imposed by our protocol.
We also show that in our setting, surprisingly, any pair of maxmin strategies
also specifies a robust-optimization equilibrium. Finally, we consider the case
where one party has full information while the other party has no information,
and show how the informed party is able to use her information so that the
negotiation result will be better for her.
The contribution of this work is threefold. First, we introduce elegant strate-
gies that specify a SPE, and provide a substantial analysis for showing that they
indeed form a SPE. We also provide an improved algorithm for computing a SPE
strategy for the studied negotiation protocol. The second contribution of our
work is that we show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely
implements the RC rule. As noted by Kıbrıs and Sertel [12], who studied the
RC rule, the descriptive relevance of the RC rule for real-life bargaining depends
on the existence of non-cooperative games that implement it, and to the best
of our knowledge our paper is the first to find such a connection. Finally, we
provide an analysis of the negotiation protocol under a no information setting,
which has not been considered before.
2 Related Work
Negotiation protocols and the strategic interaction they imply have been exten-
sively studied. We refer to the books of [18], [13], and [10] for extensive coverage
of the different approaches. The traditional assumption in negotiation theory is
that there is a continuum of feasible outcomes, but many real-life negotiation
scenarios violate these assumptions. Indeed, there are several works that con-
sider problems with a finite number of outcomes. For example, see [24], [14], [15]
and recently [17]. All of these works focus on negotiation when the preferences
are represented by a cardinal utility, while we study negotiation with ordinal
preferences.
Many other works study negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set
of outcomes (for example, [23]). Sequential procedures, in particular the fallback
bargaining method, have attracted considerable interest [21, 11, 6, 12, 8], since
they satisfy some nice theoretical properties. All of these works study bargaining
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rules that are useful in a cooperative environment. We study a negotiation
protocol that is useful in a non-cooperative environment, and show that its SPE
almost completely implements the individually rational variant of the fallback
bargaining method, i.e., the RC rule [12]. We note that the RC bargaining rule
is equivalent to Bucklin voting with two voters, and thus our result can also be
interpreted as a (weak) SPE implementation of the Bucklin rule where there are
two voters.
There are few works that study negotiation protocols with ordinal prefer-
ences over a finite set of outcomes. De Clippel et al. [9] study the problem
of selection of arbitrators, and they concentrate on two-step protocols. The
most closely related works are Anbarci’s papers. In [3] he introduces the Vot-
ing by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) negotiation protocol, which we
study here, and shows the possible SPE results in different scenarios. Implic-
itly, this work shows that the SPE result is unique and Pareto optimal. In [4]
he introduces three additional negotiation protocols. Moreover, he sharpens his
previous result by exactly identifying the SPE result of the VAOV protocol, and
by providing an algorithm that computes a SPE strategy. He also shows that
if the outcomes are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possi-
bility set and as the number of outcomes tends to infinity the VAOV protocol
converges to the equal area rule [22]. We provide a more efficient algorithm
that finds an elegant SPE strategy. In addition, we were able to establish the
relationship between the VAOV protocol and the RC rule, which works with a
finite number of outcomes, and we also analyze the no information setting.
3 The Negotiation Protocol
We assume that there are two negotiation parties, p1 and p2, negotiating over
a set of potential outcomes O = {o1, ..., om}, where p1 is the party that makes
the first offer. Each party has a preference order over the potential outcomes
that does not permit any ties. Formally, the preferences of a party p are a
strict order, ≻p, which is a complete, transitive and irreflexive binary relation
on O. We write o′ ≻p o to denote that party p strictly prefers o′ to o, and
o′ p o to denote that o′ ≻p o or o′ = o (i.e o′ is the exact same outcome as o).
Clearly, each party would like to maximize her utility, i.e., that the result of the
negotiation will be the outcome that is placed as high as possible according to
her preferences.
We analyze the following negotiation protocol, which is the VAOV protocol
of [3]. The parties make offers alternately. No offer can be made twice, but
an agreement must be reached since we assume that any agreement is preferred
by both parties over a no-agreement result. We also assume that lotteries are
not valid offers, as in most real-life negotiations. Formally, denote by Ot the
set of available outcomes at round t, and the let O1 = O. At round 1, party
p1 offers an outcome o ∈ O1 to p2. If p2 accepts, the negotiation terminates
successfully with o as the result of the negotiation. Otherwise, party p2 offers
an outcome o′ ∈ O2 = O1 \ {o}. If p1 accepts, the negotiation terminates
4
successfully with o′ as the result of the negotiation. Otherwise, p1 offers an
outcome o′′ ∈ O3 = O2 \ {o′} to p2, and so on. If no offer was accepted until
round m then the last available outcome is accepted in the last round as the
result of the negotiation. We denote by pi the party whose turn it is to make
an offer at a given round, and by pj the other party. That is, pi = p1 in odd
round numbers and pi = p2 otherwise.
We first provide a general result that is useful with any model of information.
Consider the following definition:
Definition 1. In each round t, let Ljt be the ⌊|Ot|/2⌋ lowest ranked outcomes in
≻pj . If |Ot| is odd, then let L
i
t be the ⌊|Ot|/2⌋ lowest ranked outcomes in ≻pi .
If |Ot| is even, then Lit is the |Ot|/2− 1 lowest ranked outcomes in ≻pi .
We show that in each round t we can identify a set of outcomes that cannot
be the negotiation result if the parties are rational, regardless of the information
they have. Intuitively, these are all the outcomes that are in the lower parts of
the preference orders of both parties, denoted by Lowt. We denote all of the
other outcomes by JGt.
Definition 2. Given a round t, let Lowt = {o : o ∈ Lit ∪ L
j
t}, and JGt =
Ot \ Lowt.
Lemma 1. Let o be the result of the negotiation if both parties are rational.
Then, o /∈ Lowt.
Proof. Starting from round t where |Ot| = mt, each party will be able to reject
all of the offers that she would receive from the other party, except for the offer
she would receive in the last round. Specifically, if mt is odd, p
i and pj can
reject at most ⌊mt/2⌋ offers. If mt is even, p
i can reject at most ⌊mt/2⌋ − 1
offers (since it is pi’s turn to offer) and pj can reject at most ⌊mt/2⌋ offers.
That is, each party pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, can reject at most |Lkt | offers. Therefore,
each party will always be able to guarantee that the result of the negotiation
will be an outcome that is placed higher than the |Lkt | lowest outcomes in her
preference order. Therefore, o /∈ Lowt.
We now analyze the negotiation protocol under two different models of in-
formation: full information and no information. In each case we are interested
in finding the best actions that a party should take, given the information that
she has.
4 Full Information
In this setting we assume that each party has full information about the other
party’s preference order, and she will thus take this information into account
when calculating her best strategy. Therefore, in the full information setting we
are interested in finding a SPE. Since [3] showed that the SPE result is unique,
it suffices to find one set of strategies that specify a SPE.
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Recall that SPE is a mapping that maps the histories of players’ choices.
Note that in our case if an offer was accepted the game is over. Therefore, a
history for pi, the party whose turn it is to make an offer at a given round, con-
sists of a sequence of outcomes that were proposed and rejected in the previous
rounds. Let Hit = (o
1, o2, ..., ot−1) be the history for pi at round t, and note
that Ot = O \ Hit . Let o
−
t be the least preferred outcome in Ot according to
≻pj . We show that the following strategy specifies the offering strategy in our
SPE.
Strategy 1 (Offering Strategy). Given a history Hit , if It = L
i
t ∩ L
j
t 6= ∅
then offer o ∈ It, else offer o
−
t .
A history for pj , the party whose turn it is to decide whether to accept or
reject an offer at a given round, consists of a sequence of outcomes that were
proposed and rejected in the previous rounds and an additional outcome o that
was offered by pi in the current round. Let Hjt = H
i
t + o = (o
1, o2, ..., ot−1, o)
be the history for pj at round t. In addition, given a round t and history for
pi, Hit , let o
i
t be an outcome o ∈ It = L
i
t ∩ L
j
t if It 6= ∅, and o
−
t otherwise.
Given a round t and history for pj , Hjt , let oa(H
j
t ) be the single outcome in
Om = O\Him, where H
i
m = H
j
t +o
i
t+1+ ...+o
i
m−1. That is, oa(H
j
t ) is the result
of the negotiation if both parties reject all of the offers that they get (except for
the last offer) from round t and on, but use the offering strategy that is specified
by Strategy 1 from round t + 1 and on. We show that the following strategy
specifies the response strategy in our SPE.
Strategy 2 (Response Strategy). Given a history Hjt , if o pj oa(H
j
t )
then accept o, else reject o.
To illustrate the strategies of our SPE, consider the following examples:
Example 1. Suppose that
≻p1= o6 ≻ o5 ≻ o4 ≻ o3 ≻ o2 ≻ o1
≻p2= o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o2 ≻ o6 ≻ o4 ≻ o5.
Following Definition 1, L11 = {o2, o1} and L
2
1 = {o6, o4, o5}. Therefore, I1 =
∅ and according to the offering strategy (Strategy 1) p1 would offer p2’s least
preferred outcome - o5. Then, according to the response strategy (Strategy 2)
p2 would reject, since oa((o5)) = o3 ≻p2 o5, as we will show. In round 2,
L12 = {o1, o2} and L
2
2 = {o6, o4}, and thus p
2 would offer o1. Now p
1 would
reject, and offer o4, p
2 would reject and offer o2, p
1 would reject and offer o6,
and in the final round p2 would reject and offer o3 which is accepted as the result
of the negotiation since no other outcome is available.
Example 2. Now suppose that
≻p1= o6 ≻ o5 ≻ o4 ≻ o3 ≻ o2 ≻ o1
≻p2= o1 ≻ o3 ≻ o6 ≻ o2 ≻ o4 ≻ o5.
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Following Definition 1, L11 = {o2, o1} and L
2
1 = {o2, o4, o5}. Therefore, I1 =
{o2} and according to Strategy 1 p1 would offer o2. Then, p2 will reject, since
oa((o2)) = o6 ≻p2 o2, as we will show. In round 2, L
1
2 = {o3, o1} and L
2
2 =
{o4, o5}, I2 = ∅, and thus p2 would offer o1. In each subsequent round the
parties would offer each other the least preferred outcomes, until the final round
where o6 will be accepted as the result of the negotiation.
In order to prove that our strategies specify a SPE, we need a deeper un-
derstating of the offering and response strategies. We note that in the offering
strategy (Strategy 1), pi offers an outcome from the set It if it is not empty. We
now show the relation between the set It and the set JGt.
Lemma 2. |JGt| = |It|+ 1
Proof. Suppose that in round t, |Ot| = mt is odd. Then
|Lit \ It| =
⌊mt
2
⌋
− |It| =
mt − 1
2
− |It|
|Ljt \ It| =
⌊mt
2
⌋
− |It| =
mt − 1
2
− |It|
Therefore,
|JGt| = mt − 2 · (
mt − 1
2
− |It|)− |It| = |It|+ 1
Now suppose that mt is even. Then
|Lit \ It| =
⌊mt
2
⌋
− 1− |It| =
mt
2
− 1− |It|
|Ljt \ It| =
⌊mt
2
⌋
− |It| =
mt
2
− |It|
Therefore,
|JGt| = mt − (
mt
2
− 1− |It|)− (
mt
2
− |It|)− |It| = |It|+ 1
Considering Lemma 1, we show a simple corollary. Let oeq be the SPE result.
We get:
Corollary 1. oeq /∈ Lowt.
If we combine the findings from Corollary 1 and Lemma 2, we get that if the
set It is empty, i.e., the intersection between the lower parts of the preference
orders of the parties is empty, then the set JGt contains only one outcome, oeq.
Corollary 2. If It = ∅ then JGt = {oeq}.
Proof. From Lemma 2, |JGt| = 1. Assume that oeq /∈ JGt, then oeq ∈ Lowt, in
contradiction to Lemma 1.
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Next, we show how the transition from round t to round t + 1 affects the
number of outcomes in Lkt+1, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 3. Suppose that in round t, pi offered an outcome o and pj rejected it,
then in round t+ 1, |Lit+1| = |L
j
t | − 1 and |L
j
t+1| = |L
i
t|
Proof. Assume |Ot| = mt is even, then by definition |Lit| =
mt
2
−1 and |Ljt | =
mt
2
.
After that pi offered the outcome o and pj rejected it, mt+1 is odd, and the
roles are switched between pi and pj . Therefore, |Lit+1| = |L
j
t+1| =
⌊
mt+1
2
⌋
=⌊
mt−1
2
⌋
=
⌊
mt
2
− 1
2
⌋
= mt
2
− 1. Now assume that mt is odd, then |Lit| = |L
j
t | =⌊
mt
2
⌋
= mt−1
2
. After that pi offered the outcome o and pj rejected it, mt+1 is
even, and the roles are switched between pi and pj . Therefore, |Ljt+1| =
mt−1
2
and |Lit+1| =
mt−1
2
− 1 .
We note that the number of outcomes in Lkt is important, since we already
showed in Corollary 1 that these are the outcomes that cannot be an equilib-
rium result. Indeed, it is more important to understand how the transition from
round t to round t+ 1 affects which outcomes become part of Lkt+1. Obviously,
it depends on the offer that was made in round t. The following three lemmas
analyze this transition, based on the offers that are made according to Strat-
egy 1. Specifically, Lemma 4 together with Lemma 5 cover the offering strategy
where It = ∅, and Lemma 5 together with Lemma 6 cover the offering strategy
where It 6= ∅.
Lemma 4. In round t, if pi offers o /∈ Lit and p
j rejects it, then Ljt+1 ← L
i
t
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the sets Ljt+1 and L
i
t have the same size. There-
fore, if pi offers o /∈ Lit and p
j rejects it, we can be assured that Ljt+1 = L
i
t.
Lemma 5. In round t, if pi offers o ∈ Ljt and p
j rejects it, then Lit+1 ← L
j
t \{o}
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the set Lit+1 contains one outcome less than the
set Ljt . Therefore, if p
i offers o ∈ Ljt and p
j rejects it, o is the only outcome
that becomes unavailable in round t + 1, and we can thus be assured that
Lit+1 = L
j
t \ {o}.
Lemma 6. In round t, if pi offers o ∈ Lit and p
j rejects it, then Ljt+1 ←
Lit \ {o} ∪ {o
′}
Proof. According to lemma 3, the sets Ljt+1 and L
i
t have the same size. There-
fore, if pi offers o ∈ Lit and p
j rejects it, o is the only outcome that becomes
unavailable in round t+ 1, and thus there must be another outcome o′ ∈ Ot+1
that becomes part of Ljt+1.
Note that when pj follows Strategy 2 she computes the outcome oa(H
j
t ) to
decide whether to accept or reject the offer that she gets from pi. By definition,
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Lemma 7. oa(H
j
t ) = oa(H
j
t + o
i
t+1).
We now show that if, in a given round t, pi follows Strategy 1, i.e., oa(H
j
t ) =
oa(H
i
t+o
i
t), then oa(H
j
t ) has some desirable properties. For example, it is Pareto
optimal in Ot, i.e., ∀o ∈ Ot\{oa(Hit+o
i
t)}, oa(H
i
t+o
i
t) ≻pi o or oa(H
i
t+o
i
t) ≻pj o.
For ease of notation, let oat = oa(H
i
t + o
i
t).
Lemma 8. Given any history Hit , o
i
t ≺pj oat, oat ∈ JGt, and oat is Pareto
optimal in Ot.
Proof. We prove by induction on m. If m = 2 and t = 1, without loss of
generality (WLOG) assume that ≻p2= o1 ≻ o2. Since It = ∅, o
1
t = o
−
t = o2 and
H1t = () by definition. Thus, oat = oa(H
1
t + o
1
t ) = o1. In addition, JGt = {o1},
and therefore o1t ≺p2 oat and oat ∈ JG1 as required. Since Ot \{oat} = {o2} and
o2 ≺p2 oat then oat is also Pareto optimal in Ot. Now, assume that if there are
m−1 outcomes in round t+1, oit+1 ≺pj oa(H
i
t+1+o
i
t+1), oa(H
i
t+1+o
i
t+1) ∈ JGt+1
and oa(H
i
t+1 + o
i
t+1) is Pareto optimal in Ot+1. We show that when there
are m outcomes in round t, oit ≺pj oa(H
i
t + o
i
t) = oat, oat ∈ JGt and oat is
Pareto optimal in Ot. According to Lemma 7, if H
j
t = H
i
t + o
i
t we get that
oat = oa(H
i
t + o
i
t) = oa(H
i
t + o
i
t + o
i
t+1) = oa(H
i
t+1 + o
i
t+1). Now, if It = ∅
and thus oit = o
−
t ∈ L
j
t then according to Lemmas 4 and 5 JGt+1 = JGt. If
It 6= ∅ and thus oit ∈ It then according to Lemmas 5 and 6 JGt+1 ⊆ JGt.
According to the induction assumption, oa(H
i
t+1 + o
i
t+1) ∈ JGt+1 and thus
oat = oa(H
i
t+1 + o
i
t+1) ∈ JGt. In addition, o
i
t ∈ L
j
t by definition and since we
showed that oat ∈ JGt, we get that oit ≺pj oat. Finally, since oat is Pareto
optimal in Ot+1, Ot = Ot+1 ∪ {oit}, and o
i
t ≺pj oat, we conclude that oat is
Pareto optimal in Ot.
Rephrasing Lemma 8, we showed that given any history Hit , if both parties
follow Strategies 1 and 2 from round t and on, pj would always reject the offers
that she gets from pi (i.e., oit, o
i
t+1, ..., o
i
m−1), and the negotiation result would
be oat, which would be accepted in the last round. Moreover, the negotiation
result oat is Pareto optimal in Ot, Ot+1, ..., Om.
Before we prove that Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE we need to add some
definitions. We first define a distance function for each party pk, that given an
outcome ox /∈ Lkt counts the number of outcomes o /∈ L
k
t such that ox pk o.
Intuitively, this is the number of outcomes a party can offer until a round t′
where ox becomes part of L
k
t′ . Formally:
Definition 3. dk,x,t = |{o ∈ Ot : ox pk o ∧ o /∈ L
k
t }| where k ∈ {1, 2}
We also define the number of offers that are made before reaching a round
t′ where It′ = ∅.
Definition 4. Let ℓk,t be the number of offers a party p
k offers according to
Strategy 1 from round t until round t′ where It′ = ∅.
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Recall our previous examples. In Example 1 at round 1, I1 = ∅ and thus
ℓ1,1 = ℓ2,1 = 0. The distance of o3 at round 1 is d1,3,1 = 1 for party p
1 and
d2,3,1 = 2 for party p
2. In Example 2, I1 6= ∅ but I2 = ∅ and thus ℓ1,1 = 1
and ℓ2,1 = 0. The distance of o6 at round 1 for the parties is d1,6,1 = 4 and
d2,6,1 = 1, and the distance of o3 at round 1 for the parties is d1,3,1 = 1 and
d2,3,1 = 2.
We also make the following simple observation, which is true since we use
an alternating offers protocol:
Lemma 9. At any round t, ℓj,t ≤ ℓi,t.
Our main theorem is as follows:
Theorem 10. Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE.
Proof. We prove by induction on m. If m = 2 and t = 1, WLOG assume that
≻p2= o1 ≻ o2. Thus, JGt = {o1}, and according to Corollary 2, o1 is the SPE
result. Indeed, according to Strategy 1 p1 will offer o2 in the first round and
p2 will reject it according to Strategy 2 since oa((o2)) = o1 ≻2 o2. In the next
round pi = p2 will offer o1, p
1 will accept it and then the negotiation will end
with o1 as the negotiation result. Clearly there are only two states where p
2
has the option to deviate: on the equilibrium path, i.e., where H2t = (o2), and
off the equilibrium path, i.e., where H2t = (o1). Where H
2
t = (o2), p
2 has no
incentive to deviate from the response strategy and accept the offer of o2 from
p1, since o1 ≻2 o2. Where H2t = (o1), p
2 has no incentive to deviate and reject
the offer of o1, since then o2 would become the last available outcome and thus
the negotiation result, but o1 ≻2 o2. Similarly, there is only one state where
p1 has the option to deviate, i.e., H1t = (). In this state p
1 has no incentive to
deviate from the offering strategy and offer o1, since p
2 will accept it (because
o1 ≻2 o2) and o1 is already the SPE result if p1 follows the offering strategy.
Now, assume that if there are m − 1 outcomes in round t + 1, our strate-
gies specify a SPE. We show that they specify a SPE when there are m out-
comes in round t. We first consider the strategy of pj at round t. Note that
oa(H
j
t ) = oa(H
i
t + o) = oa(H
i
t+1) by definition, and oa(H
i
t+1) is the SPE result
of following our strategies from state Hit+1 according to Lemma 8 combined
with the induction assumption. Clearly, if according to the response strategy
(Strategy 2) pj should reject the offer o, it is because oa(H
j
t ) ≻pj o. Therefore,
it is not worthwhile for pj to deviate and accept o instead of oa(H
i
t+1) = oa(H
j
t ).
Similarly, if according to the response strategy pj should accept an offer o, it is
because o pj oa(H
j
t ). Therefore, it is not worthwhile for p
j to deviate and re-
ject o in order to get as the negotiation result the outcome oa(H
i
t+1) = oa(H
j
t ).
Overall, pj does not have an incentive to deviate in round t. According to the
induction assumption, Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE when there are m − 1
outcomes in round t+ 1. Therefore, pj does not have any incentive to deviate.
We now concentrate on the strategy of pi at round t, but we first derive
some general inequalities. Given a history Hit , suppose that there is an outcome
ox ∈ Ot such that ox ≻pi oat = oa(H
i
t + o
i
t). According to Lemma 8, since
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ox ≻pi oat, oat ≻pj ox. Suppose that both parties follow strategies 1 and 2, and
let t′ be the round in which JGt′ = {oat}. Then, in round t, ℓi,t < di,at,t and
ℓj,t < dj,at,t (otherwise, oat /∈ JGt′). By definition, t′ = ℓi,t + ℓj,t. In addition,
since JGt′ = {oat}, ox must be part of Lowt′′ for some t′′ < t′ (otherwise,
ox ∈ JGt′). Since ox ≻pi oat and ℓi,t < di,at,t, it must be that ox is part of L
j
t′′ ,
that is, dj,x,t ≤ ℓj,t . In summary:
ℓi,t < di,at,t < di,x,t
dj,x,t ≤ ℓj,t < dj,at,t
(1)
Now assume that in round t pi deviates, and the result of the negotiation,
if both parties follow our strategies from round t + 1, is ox. Note that p
i in
round t + 1 is pj in round t, and thus oat ≻pi ox. Therefore, we use the same
arguments as above to get
ℓi,t+1 < di,x,t+1 < di,at,t+1
dj,at,t+1 ≤ ℓj,t+1 < dj,x,t+1
(2)
Now, assume by contradiction that there is an outcome od /∈ It such that
if pi offers od the negotiation result will be ox, ox ≻pi oat. We first analyze
the case where pj rejects the offer of od, since ox ≻pj od (otherwise, p
j would
have accepted). We examine the change in the distance function for pi and pj ,
for outcomes oat and ox, from round t to round t+ 1. According to Lemma 3,
|Lit+1| + 1 = |L
j
t |, and since ox ≻pj od and oat ≻pj od, dj,x,t and dj,at,t do not
change when moving to round t + 1. Let c be an integer. Then, di,at,t + c =
dj,at,t+1, dj,at,t = di,at,t+1, and dj,x,t = di,x,t+1. If we combine these 3 equations
with equations 2 we get that ℓj,t+1 < dj,x,t < dj,at,t and di,at,t + c ≤ ℓi,t+1.
Adding equations 1 we get that ℓi,t < ℓi,t+1 − c and ℓi,t+1 < ℓj,t. Adding
Lemma 9 we can conclude that ℓi,t+1 < ℓj,t ≤ ℓi,t < ℓi,t+1 − c. That is,
ℓi,t+1 ≤ ℓi,t+1 − c − 2, thus c ≤ −2. However, the distance function cannot
decrease by more than 1 when moving from round t to t+ 1, thus c ≥ −1.
We now analyze the case where pj accepts the offer of od, since od pj ox.
We examine the change in the distance function for pi and pj , for outcomes oat
and ox, from round t to round t + 1. Note that since p
i deviates, od ≻pi oat.
According to Lemma 8, oat ≻pj od. According to Lemma 3, |L
i
t+1| + 1 = |L
j
t |,
and since oat ≻pj od, dj,at,t does not change when moving to round t + 1.
However, since od ≻pj ox, dj,x,t increases by one when moving to round t + 1.
Let c be an integer. Then, di,at,t + c = dj,at,t+1, dj,at,t = di,at,t+1, and dj,x,t +
1 = di,x,t+1. If we combine these 3 equations with equations 2 we get that
ℓi,t+1 < dj,x,t + 1 < dj,at,t and di,at,t + c ≤ ℓj,t+1. Adding equation 1 we get
that ℓi,t < ℓj,t+1 − c and ℓi,t+1 − 1 < ℓj,t. Adding Lemma 9 we can conclude
that ℓi,t+1 − 1 < ℓj,t ≤ ℓi,t < ℓj,t+1 − c. That is, ℓj,t+1 − 1 ≤ ℓj,t+1− c− 2, thus
c ≤ −1. However, in order for di,at,t to decrease by at least one, oat ≻pi od, but
in our case od ≻pi oat.
Overall, we showed that pi does not have an incentive to deviate in round
t. According to the induction assumption, Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE
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when there are m− 1 outcomes in round t+1. Therefore, pi does not have any
incentive to deviate.
Finally, note that trivial exploration of the whole game tree in order to derive
the SPE would take at least O(2m) operations, since there can be m− 1 rounds
in which a party pi can offer any outcome from the available outcomes and the
other party pj can decide either to accept the offer or reject it. The complexity
of finding a SPE strategy of [4] is not explicitly analyzed, but its running time
is at least O(m2). Our approach provides elegant strategies that are easy to
implement and are (computationally) more efficient: given a state in the game
tree (i.e. given any history Hit or H
j
t ), we compute a SPE strategy from the
current state in time that is linear in m. Indeed, in our approach we only need
to simulate one branch of the tree (to find oa(H
i
t ) or oa(H
j
t )) and then trace
the intersection between Lit and L
j
t .
4.1 Properties
We first note that since we showed that the result of following Strategies 1
and 2 is Pareto optimal, we proved that they specify a SPE, and the SPE
result is unique, we can infer that the SPE result of the protocol is Pareto
optimal. We now move to analyze the relationship between the SPE result of the
protocol and the results of the designed Rational Compromise (RC) bargaining
rule [12]. The RC rule is a private case of the Unanimity Compromise rule,
where any agreement is preferred by both parties over a no-agreement result,
as we assume. With our notations, the RC rule can be rephrased as the set
RC = {ox|maxox∈O mink∈{1,2}(dk,x,1 + |L
k
1 | − 1)}. It can also be computed by
the following steps:
1. Let v = 1
2. For each k ∈ {1, 2}, let Bkv = {the v most preferred outcomes in ≻pk}.
3. If |B1v ∩B
2
v | > 0 then return B
1
v ∩B
2
v as the result.
4. Else, v ← v + 1 and go to line 2.
We note that the RC rule may return either one or two outcomes, while our
protocol always results with a single outcome. Surprisingly, the SPE result of
the negotiation protocol is always part of the set returned by the RC rule. The
intuition is that our strategies specify a SPE by making offers and rejecting
them until It = ∅. At this stage JGt = {oeq}, and by definition the set JGt
is the intersection of the upper parts of the preferences of both parties, which
corresponds to the B1v ∩B
2
v returned by RC.
Theorem 11. oeq ∈ RC
Proof. Let t be the round where It = ∅ after both parties follow our strategies.
By Corollary 2, JGt = {oeq}. Rephrasing the definition of JGt we get that
JGt = B
i
|Ot|−|Lit|
∩Bj
|Ot|−|L
j
t |
. If |Ljt | = |L
i
t|, then for any v where v ≤ |Ot|−|L
j
t |
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, Biv ∩B
j
v = {oeq} or B
i
v ∩B
j
v = ∅. If |L
j
t | = |L
i
t|+ 1, then for any v where the
v ≤ |Ot| − |L
j
t |, B
i
v ∩ B
j
v = {oeq} or B
i
v ∩ B
j
v = ∅, and for v = |Ot| − |L
i
t| it is
possible that Biv ∩B
j
v = {oeq, ox}, for some outcome ox. Overall, oeq ∈ RC.
Based on Theorem 11, we can derive interesting results regarding the rela-
tionship between the RC rule and the SPE result of the negotiation protocol:
Theorem 12. 1. If RC = {o} then oeq = o.
2. If oeq is the SPE result let oeq′ be the SPE result if p
1 and p2 switch their
rules (i.e., p2 starts the negotiation). If oeq 6= oeq′ , then RC = {oeq, oeq′}
3. If m is odd and ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is even or if m is even and ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is odd,
then |RC| = 1.
4. If |RC| = {ox, oy} and ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is odd then oeq = ox and ox ≻pi oy. If
ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is even then oeq = oy and oy ≻pj ox.
Proof. 1. An easy corollary of Theorem 11.
2. An easy corollary of Theorem 11.
3. If m is odd and ℓ1,1+ ℓ2,1 is even or if m is even and ℓ1,1+ ℓ2,1 is odd, then
mt is odd. Therefore, |L1t | = |L
2
t | by definition. Then, by Theorem 11, for
any v where v ≤ |Ot| − |L1t | , B
1
v ∩ B
2
v = {oeq} or B
1
v ∩ B
2
v = ∅. That is,
RC = {oeq}.
4. |RC| = 2, thus there exists v such that B1v ∩B
2
v = {ox, oy}, and for every
v′ < v, B1v′∩B
2
v′ = ∅. From Theorem 11, oeq = ox or oeq = oy. Let t be the
round such that It = ∅ and JGt = {oeq}. That is, B1|Ot|−|L1t |
∩B2
|Ot|−|L2t |
=
{oeq}. Therefore, |L1t | 6= |L
2
t |, and thus mt is even. If ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is odd
then it is p2’s turn to offer. That is, |L2t |+ 1 = |L
1
t |, and since ox ≻p1 oy,
oy ∈ L1t . Therefore, oeq = ox. Similarly, if ℓ1,1 + ℓ2,1 is even then it is
p1’s turn to offer. That is, |L1t |+ 1 = |L
2
t |, and since oy ≻p2 ox, ox ∈ L
2
t .
Therefore, oeq = oy.
Finally, we adapt the monotonicity criterion that the RC rule satisfies for
our domain, and show that the negotiation protocol is monotonic.
Definition 5. A negotiation protocol is monotonic if given an instance (O,≻p1
,≻p2) where the SPE result is oeq, then for any instance (O
′,≻′p1 ,≻
′
p2) such
that:
1. O ⊂ O′.
2. For any o1, o2 ∈ O, o1 6= o2, and for k ∈ {1, 2}, if o1 ≻pk o2 then o1 ≻
′
pk
o2.
3. For any o ∈ O′ \O, and for k ∈ {1, 2}, o ≻′
pk
oeq.
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we have that o′eq ≻
′
pk
oeq.
Theorem 13. The negotiation protocol is monotonic.
Proof. Given an instance (O,≻p1 ,≻p2), we know from Theorem 11 that oeq ∈
RC. If we add a set of outcomes O′ \O such that for every outcome o ∈ O′ \O,
o ≻ oeq for both parties, then for every outcome o
′ in the set returned by
the RC rule on the modified instance (O′,≻′
p1
,≻′
p2
), o′ ≻ oeq by both parties.
Since o′eq ∈ RC on (O
′,≻′p1 ,≻
′
p2), we get that o
′
eq ≻ oeq for both parties, as
required.
5 No Information
We now consider the case of no information, where we assume that neither
party knows the preference order of the other party. Moreover, the parties do not
even hold any prior probability distribution over each other’s possible preference
orders. A common solution concept for this case is an ex-post equilibrium,
or in our case, an ex-post SPE. Intuitively, this is a strategy profile in which
the strategy of each party depends only on her own type, i.e., its preference
order, and it is a SPE for every realization of the other party’s type (i.e. her
private preference order). Formally, let sk(≺) be a strategy for player k ∈ {1, 2}
given a preference order ≺, and let F([s1(≺), s2(≺′)]) be the negotiation result
if both parties follow their strategies. In the ex-post setting, a strategy for
party k ∈ {1, 2}, sk, is a best response to s3−k if for every strategy s′k and for
every preference orders ≺,≺′, F([sk(≺), s3−k(≺′)]) k F([s′k(≺), s3−k(≺
′)]). A
strategy profile [s1, s2] is an ex-post equilibrium if s1 is a best response to s2
and s2 is a best response to s1, and it is an ex-post SPE if it is an ex-post
equilibrium in every subgame of the game. We show that ex-post equilibrium,
and thus also ex-post SPE, are too strong to exist in our setting.
Theorem 14. There are no two strategies that specify an ex-post equilibrium
for our protocol.
Proof. Clearly, every ex-post SPE is also a SPE (i.e., in the full information
setting), and we can thus use our previous results that characterize the SPE.
Assume by contradiction that there are two strategies s1, s2 for parties p
1, p2,
respectively, such that [s1, s2] is an ex-post SPE. Let ≺1= o1 ≺ o2 ≺ o5 ≺ o4 ≺
o3 ≺ o6, and let ≺2= o1 ≺ o2 ≺ o6 ≺ o3 ≺ o5 ≺ o4. Following our strategies we
get that the SPE result is o4. Since the SPE result is unique and every ex-post
SPE is also a SPE, F([s1(≺1), s2(≺2)]) = o4. Now consider ≺′1= o4 ≺ o5 ≺
o1 ≺ o2 ≺ o3 ≺ o6. According to Corollary 1, F([s1(≺′1), s2(≺2)]) = o3. Note
that o4 ≺p1 o3. Consider the following strategy: s
′
1(≺) = s1(≺
′
1) if ≺=≺1, and
s′1(≺) = s1(≺) otherwise. That is, F([s1(≺1), s2(≺2)]) ≺p1 F([s
′
1(≺1), s2(≺2)]),
and thus s1 is not a best response to s2.
We note that Theorem 14 also implies that there is no solution in dominant
strategies. Another approach to uncertainty, which follows a conservative at-
titude, is that a party pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, who wants to maximize her utility may
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want to play a maxmin strategy. That is, since the preference order and the
strategy of the other party p3−k are not known, it is sensible to assume that
p3−k happens to play a strategy that causes the greatest harm to pk, and to act
accordingly. pk then guarantees the maxmin value of the game for her, which
in our case is a set of outcomes such that no other outcome that is ranked lower
than all of the outcomes in this set will be accepted as the result of the negotia-
tion, regardless of the preferences of p3−k. Before we show the maxmin strategy
we define the complement sets for the sets Lkt , i.e., the sets of highest ranked
outcomes.
Definition 6. In each round t, for each party pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, Ukt = Ot \ L
k
t .
The maxmin strategy, which is composed of offering and response strategies,
is defined as follows:
Strategy 3 (Maxmin Strategy). Given a history Hit , offer any o ∈ U
i
t .
Given a history Hjt , if o ∈ U
j
t then accept o, else reject o.
We now prove that our strategy specifies a maxmin strategy, and that a
party pk that follows it can guarantee the maxmin value of the game, which is
the set Uk1 . We denote the party that uses Strategy 3 by p
max and the other
party, which might try to minimize the utility of pmax, by pmin. Note that we
need to handle both the case where pmax starts the negotiation (i.e, pmax = p1)
and the case where pmin starts it (i.e., pmin = p1). We re-use Lemmas 4, 5 and
6, since they do not depend on the full-information assumption. Furthermore,
we add a fourth lemma, which complements these three lemmas by considering
the fourth possible offer type.
Lemma 15. In round t, if pi offers o /∈ Ljt and p
j rejects it, then Lit+1 ←
Ljt \ {o
′}, where o 6= o′.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the set Lit+1 contains one outcome less than the
set Ljt . Therefore, if p
i offers o /∈ Ljt and p
j rejects it, there must be another
outcome o′ ∈ Ot that left the set L
j
t .
For ease of notation, we write U ≻p o for U ⊂ O to denote that party p
strictly prefers all of the outcomes in the set U over o. The intuition of our
proof is as follows. We show that if pmax deviates from the strategy specified
by Strategy 3, pmin is able to make the negotiation result in an outcome o, such
that Umax1 ≻pmax o.
Theorem 16. Strategy 3 specifies a maxmin strategy, and the maxmin value of
the game is the set Umax1 .
Proof. We will prove by induction on m. If m = 2 WLOG assume that ≻pmax=
o1 ≻ o2. If pmax = p1 then Umax1 = {o1, o2} and clearly one of them will be
the negotiation result. If pmax = p2 then Umax1 = {o1}. If p
min offers o1 in the
first round, according to our strategy pmax should accept it. If pmin offers o2 in
the first round, according to our strategy pmax should reject it, and offer o1 in
15
the next round. Since this is the last round, o1 will be accepted. In any case,
the negotiation result is o1. On the other hand, if p
max deviates and rejects the
offer of o1 or accepts the offer of o2, then o2 will be the result of the negotiation,
but Umax1 ≻pmax o2. Now, assume that if there are m − 1 outcomes in round
t + 1 our strategy specifies a maxmin strategy, and the maxmin value of the
game is the set Umaxt+1 . We show that our strategy specifies a maxmin strategy,
and the maxmin value of the game is the set Umaxt when there are m outcomes
in round t.
Assume that it is pmax’s turn to offer. Clearly, if pmax deviates and offers an
outcome o such that Umaxt ≻pmax o then p
min can accept it, and the negotiation
results in o. On the other hand, if pmax offers any o ∈ Umaxt then p
min can
either accept or reject it. If pmin rejects it then there are m − 1 outcomes in
the next round, and according to the induction assumption pmax can guarantee
the maxmin value of Umaxt+1 by following our strategy. However, according to
Lemma 4, Lmaxt+1 = L
max
t and thus U
max
t+1 ∪ {o} = U
max
t . Overall, the maxmin
value of the game is the set Umaxt .
Now assume that it is pmin’s turn to offer, and pmin offers o ∈ Umaxt . Clearly,
if pmax accepts then the negotiation result is from Umaxt . If p
max deviates and
rejects, then according to induction assumption pmax can guarantee the maxmin
value of Umaxt+1 . However, according to Lemma 15, L
max
t+1 = L
max
t \{o
′}, and thus
Umaxt+1 = U
max
t \{o}∪{o
′}. That is, o′ is a possible result of the negotiation even
though Umaxt ≻pmax o
′. Finally, assume that pmin offers o /∈ Umaxt . Clearly,
if pmax deviates and accepts, then the negotiation results in o. On the other
hand, if pmax follows our strategy and rejects, then according to the induction
assumption pmax can guarantee the maxmin value of Umaxt+1 . However, according
to Lemma 5, Lmaxt+1 = L
max
t \ {o}, and thus U
max
t+1 = U
max
t .
We note that even though a party does not hold any information regarding
the preference order of the other party, she can still guarantee that the nego-
tiation result will be from the upper part of her preference order (i.e., Uk1 ) by
following Strategy 3. This is possible since both parties have some important
common knowledge, which is the number of outcomes m, as formally captured
in Lemma 1.
Now, what will be the negotiation result if neither party knows the preference
order of the other party, but both are rational and will thus follow the maxmin
strategy? Clearly, the negotiation result will be an outcome o such that o ∈
U11 ∩ U
2
1 . That is, an outcome from the set JG1 as defined in Definition 1.
We then get an interesting observation: if I1 = ∅, JG1 = {0eq} according to
Corollary 2, thus the negotiation result is the same for both the case of full
information and the case of no information.
In addition, we note that a party pi cannot guarantee that the negotiation
result will be from a subset U ⊂ U i1, since we proved that this is the maxmin
value. However, she can heuristically offer in each round t the best outcome in
U it , instead of an arbitrarily chosen o ∈ U
i
t . Since |U
j
t | ≥ |L
j
t |, if the other party
pj is also rational and plays the maxmin strategy, there are more cases where
pj will accept this offer, and it is thus beneficial for pi to heuristically offer in
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each round t the best outcome in U it .
The idea of the maxmin strategy is that a party, not knowing the preferences
of the other party, makes a worst case assumption about the behavior of that
party (i.e., that she does not need to be rational). This assumption may seem too
restrictive, and we therefore also consider the robust-optimization equilibrium
solution concept from [1], which we adapt to out setting. Intuitively, in this
solution concept each party makes a worst case assumption about the preference
order of the other party, but each party still assumes that the other party
will play rationally and thus her aim is to maximize her utility. Formally,
given a strategy profile [s1, s2] and a preference order ≺, let ws1,≺,s2 = F([s1(≺
), s2(≺′)]), where ≺′ is a preference order such that for all ≺′′, F([s1(≺), s2(≺′
)]) p1 F([s1(≺), s2(≺
′′)]). In the robust-optimization setting, a strategy for
party k ∈ {1, 2}, sk, is a best response to s3−k if for all s
′
k and for all ≺,
wsk,≺,s3−k pk ws′k,≺,s3−k . A strategy profile [s1, s2] is a robust-optimization
equilibrium if s1 is a best response to s2 and s2 is a best response to s1. We
show that in our setting, surprisingly, every pair of maxmin strategies specifies
a robust-optimization equilibrium.
Theorem 17. If s1 and s2 are maxmin strategies, then [s1, s2] is a robust-
optimization equilibrium.
Proof. Given a preference order, ≺, let ≺op be the opposite preference order,
i.e., if ≺= o1 ≺ o2 ≺ ... ≺ om then ≺op= o1 ≻ o2 ≻ ... ≻ om. According to
Theorem 16, if sk is a maxmin strategy then the negotiation result is o ∈ Uk1 .
That is, the worst negotiation result for pk is the least preferred outcome in Uk1 ,
denoted by owo. Since the other party p
3−k is also using a maxmin strategy, o ∈
Uk1 ∩U
3−k
1 . For every preference order, ≺, if the preference order of p
3−k =≺op,
Uk1 ∩ U
3−k
1 = {owo}. That is, ws1,≺,s3−k = owo. Assume by contradiction that
there is another strategy s′k and a preference order ≺, such that ws′k,≺,s3−k ≻pk
owo. However, if the preference order of p
3−k =≺op, ws′
k
,≺,s3−k /∈ U
3−k
1 , in
contradiction to Theorem 16.
Finally, consider an asymmetric information setting, where there exists one
party that has full information about the other party’s preference order, while
the other party does not have this information. Let pinfo be the party that has
the full information, and pnull be the other party. pnull has no information and
she will thus act according to the maxmin strategy (Strategy 3). pinfo would
like to take advantage of her knowledge, so the negotiation result will be better
for her. However, according to Theorem 16, the maxmin value of the game
is Unull1 . Therefore, the best strategy for p
info is as follows. If pinfo starts
the negotiation, she should offer the best outcome from Unull1 according to her
preferences, and pnull will accept it. If pinfo starts the negotiation, she will
offer an outcome from Unull1 . If this is the best outcome according to p
info’s
preferences, she should accept it. Otherwise, in the second round pinfo should
offer the best outcome from Unull1 according to her preferences, and p
null will
accept it.
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6 Conclusion
We investigated the VAOV negotiation protocol, which is suitable for ordinal
preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We introduced strategies that specify
a SPE, and improved upon previous results by providing a linear time algo-
rithm that computes a SPE strategy. We provided substantial analysis of our
strategies, which showed the equivalence of the SPE result of the protocol in a
non-cooperative setting, to the result of the RC rule in a cooperative setting.
Finally, we analyzed the no information setting. We believe that our approach
is especially suitable for non-cooperative, multi-agent systems, since we provide
easy to implement strategies that can be computed only once if both agents
follow the SPE strategy on the equilibrium path. Moreover, there is no need for
a central authority to guarantee that the negotiation result will be Pareto opti-
mal, if both agents are rational and follow the SPE strategy. For future work,
we would like to extend the protocol to a multi-party setting and analyze the
resulting SPE. In addition, it is important to find additional implementation of
other bargaining rules by negotiation protocols, similar to the implementation
that we showed for the RC rule by the SPE of the VAOV protocol.
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7 Appendix
Even though the uniqueness of the SPE result was proven by Anbarci [3], we
provide a direct and simpler proof.
Theorem 18. The SPE result is unique.
Proof. We prove by induction on m. If m = 2, then no matter what p1 offers,
the negotiation results with the most preferred outcome of p2, and thus the SPE
is unique. Now, assume that if there are m − 1 outcomes in round t + 1, the
SPE is unique. We show that the SPE is unique when there are m outcomes
in round t. pi is able to offer an outcome o ∈ Ot. For any such o, pj either
accepts o or rejects it and the game moves to round t+1 with m− 1 outcomes.
According to the induction assumption, the SPE is unique in each sub-tree of
the game where there are m− 1 outcomes. Since pi has strict preferences, in a
SPE she will choose either an outcome that pj will accept or a sub-tree of the
game, that results with the best outcome according to pi’s preferences. That
is, in all of the offers of pi in round t that are in SPE, the SPE result is the
same.
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